Understanding recent developments in UK external trade by Kamath, Kishore & Paul, Varun
294 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q4
Introduction
Between mid-2007 and early 2009, the sterling effective
exchange rate index (ERI) depreciated by around 25%.  Since
then it has remained broadly flat (Chart 1).(2) By making 
UK exports more competitive and imports into the 
United Kingdom less affordable, weaker sterling should 
boost export volumes and reduce import volumes (known as
‘expenditure switching’).  Such an increase in net trade
(exports less imports) would boost UKGDP.
Four years after the depreciation began, a large part of the
trade response to the lower level of sterling should have been
completed.  And indeed, between 2007 Q2 (the quarter before
the depreciation began) and 2011 Q3, the net trade deficit
roughly halved from 3.0% to 1.6% of GDP (Chart 1).  In fact,
the deficit in 2011 Q1 (0.9%) was the smallest since 1998.(3)
As well as the relative prices of traded goods and services,
demand conditions in the United Kingdom and abroad will
have affected net trade.  Empirical estimates suggest that the
impact of changes in demand on trade is typically stronger
than the effect of changes in prices.  In the 2008–09 recession,
UK GDP and UK-weighted world GDP(4)fell considerably
(Chart 2).  Although they have recovered, UK GDP rebounding
by less, these changes will have significantly reduced the
demand for UK imports and exports respectively.
The aim of this article is to describe recent developments in
net trade, and to assess the impact from sterling’s
depreciation.(5) In doing so, it examines disaggregated data on
exports and imports of both goods and services.  Different 
The sterling effective exchange rate depreciated by around 25% between mid-2007 and early 2009.
That has encouraged a shift towards UK exports and away from imports, contributing to a
significant narrowing in the United Kingdom’s real trade deficit.  This article explains these
developments in more detail.  It shows that the depreciation has induced considerable switching of
expenditure by overseas companies and households towards UK goods exports, and by UK residents
away from travel services imports.  But financial services exports appear to have suffered from the
financial crisis.  And there seems to have been less of a response to the exchange rate depreciation
in other services exports and non-travel imports.  Looking ahead, both the level of sterling and
developments in the rest of the world are likely to be crucial to the United Kingdom’s trade
performance.
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(1)
(1) The authors would like to thank Binod Bhoi for his help in producing this article.
(2) The sterling effective exchange rate is weighted by 2009 UK trade shares.  See Astley,
Smith and Pain (2009) for a discussion of the possible reasons for the depreciation.
(3) This article takes at face value the quarterly ONS chained-volume trade data up to
2011 Q3 published in the UK Trade September 2011 release on 9 November 2011.
(Updating for the UK TradeOctober 2011 release on 9 December makes very little
difference.)  Throughout, the article excludes the estimated impact of missing trader
intra-community (MTIC) fraud.  Both trade volumes and prices data are volatile and
prone to revision, more so than other components of demand.  The improvement in
net trade is much larger following the recent revisions in the 2011 Blue Book:  prior to
that, the deficit was estimated at 2.0% in 2011 Q1.
(4) UK-weighted world GDP weights together 52 countries’ GDP using 2010 UK export
shares from the 2011 Pink Book.  These countries account for 90% of UK exports.
(5) This article focuses on the real trade balance.  Nominal net trade improved roughly as
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Chart 1 Sterling ERI and UK real net trade(a)
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) The vertical lines mark the beginning of the major nominal exchange rate movements that
began in 1992 Q3, 1996 Q2 and 2007 Q3.  In 1992 Q3 sterling exited the Exchange Rate
Mechanism, and by 1993 Q1 had depreciated by around 15%.  In 1996 Q2 sterling started to
appreciate, and by 1998 Q1 had increased by about 25%.Research and analysis Developments in UK external trade  295
subsectors have been affected by distinct shocks, and so their
developments have been very different.  The article tries to
control for demand movements by considering export and
import shares — that is, exports relative to world demand and
imports relative to domestic demand.  
The first section of the article discusses how UK exports 
have performed since 2007.  It considers export price
developments, before examining the impact on export shares
for both goods and services.  The next section analyses import
developments, including a particular focus on travel imports
and barriers to switching away from other imports.  The 
article concludes by drawing together the implications for 
net trade.
Export developments
The volume of goods and services that the UK economy
exports is determined primarily by the level of foreign demand
and the price of UK exports relative to prices in other
countries.  A depreciation of sterling should make UK goods
and services relatively cheaper abroad.  And foreign companies
and households should respond to that price change by
increasing their demand for UK exports.
Export prices
Between 2007 Q2 and 2011 Q2, UK exporters’ sterling export
prices rose by nearly 30% (green bars in Chart 3).(1) But world
export prices in sterling terms increased by more (the magenta
bars (inverted) and blue bars together).  Overall, relative
export prices — the sterling price of UK exports relative to
world exports (in sterling terms) — have fallen by around
15%.(2) In other words, compared to before the depreciation,
UK exports are now 15% cheaper relative to their competitors.
The response of relative export prices has been similar to that
in previous episodes of large exchange rate movements 
(Chart 4).
The United Kingdom’s export market share
Since 2008, world GDP has fallen and recovered sharply
(Chart 2), which can make it hard to isolate the 
expenditure-switching effects of the depreciation.  A closer
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Chart 2 UK GDP and UK-weighted world GDP
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) The last observation is 2011 Q2, since many countries’ GDP data for 2011 Q3 are not yet
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Chart 3 Cumulative changes in relative sterling export
prices and its components since 2007 Q2(a)(b)
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) Relative sterling export prices are UK export prices in sterling divided by world export prices
in sterling.  World export prices in sterling are world export prices in foreign currency divided
by the sterling ERI.  So higher world export prices reduce relative sterling export prices.
(b) The bars represent percentage changes for the individual series.  The orange line represents
the percentage change in relative sterling export prices.  The latter is only approximately
equal to the sum of the percentage changes for the individual series, since they are large
numbers.  
(c) The world export price series weights together 45 countries’ export prices and the oil price
using UK trade shares from the Pink Book.  These countries account for 84% of UK exports.
The last observation is 2011 Q2, since many countries’ data for 2011 Q3 are not yet available.
(1) Companies can set prices for the goods and services they export in either their home
currency or in the currency of the foreign destination.  This can affect the observed
price response in the short run.  See MacCoille, Mayhew and Turnbull (2009) for more
discussion of the currency of invoicing.
(2) Excluding oil from both UK export prices and world export prices reduces the change
in both series by around 5 percentage points over the whole period, so the movement
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Chart 4 UK export market share and relative export
prices(a)
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) The last observations are 2011 Q2.
(b) UK exports relative to UK-weighted world trade.  See footnote (1) on page 296 for a
description of UK-weighted world trade.  The dashed blue line is a pre-depreciation trend line,
based on a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter estimated from 1991 Q1 to 2007 Q2. 296 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q4
trade.  This weights together the imports of all countries in the
world according to their importance in UK exports.  It has been
even more volatile over this period.(1) In order to control for
these large fluctuations in demand, it helps to look at the
United Kingdom’s export market share:  that is, UK exports as a
share of UK-weighted world trade. 
The United Kingdom’s export share has been on a secular
decline since 1996 (Chart 4).  That is likely to reflect two
factors.  First, the increased global presence of low-cost
emerging market economies such as China and India
competing with UK exporters.  Second, the significant
appreciation of sterling in 1996, which made UK exporters 
less competitive.  Since the depreciation, the United Kingdom’s
export share has improved slightly relative to its 
pre-depreciation trend.
It is possible to estimate the relationship between UK export
volumes, UK-weighted world trade and relative export prices,
as other authors have done.  Exports are typically observed to
be more sensitive to demand movements than to relative price
changes.  Demand elasticities are usually found to be unitary,
so a 10% increase in demand leads to a 10% rise in exports.
Estimates for the price elasticity of exports — or equivalently,
the export share — typically range from -0.1 to -0.7, with an
average of -0.4 (Table A).  That is, a 10% reduction in relative
UK export prices on average leads to a 4% increase in the
UK export share, relative to trend.  The wide range reflects
uncertainties about the precise magnitude of this channel.
The equivalent observed price elasticity following the recent
depreciation appears to be lower than these estimates 
(Chart 4).  That is, the export share has increased by less than
the fall in relative export price would suggest, based on past
behaviour.
To understand why exports have been relatively weak, it is
necessary to consider goods and services exports separately.
By using detailed national accounts data from the
United Kingdom’s biggest trading partners, a measure for
world trade in goods and world trade in services can be
constructed.  The aggregate export share can then be
decomposed into the United Kingdom’s export market shares
of goods and services (Chart 5).
Goods exports
The goods export market share fell between 1997 and 2007
(Chart 5), with a particularly pronounced decline following
sterling’s appreciation in 1996.  Since the depreciation in 2007,
the share has been broadly flat.  That suggests that weaker
sterling has arrested the slide in the United Kingdom’s share of
goods trade with its major trading partners.
Chart 6 shows the deviation from an estimated trend in the
goods export share and compares it to the relative export price
for goods (magenta line, inverted).  It shows that following the
depreciation, relative export prices fell significantly (although
some of that has reversed recently).  The improvement in the
Table A Estimates of the elasticity of export volumes to relative
export prices(a)
Barrell, Choy and Kirby(2006) -0.1
Wren-Lewis and Driver (1998) -0.3
Pain et al (OECD) (2005) -0.6
Barrell, Dury and Pain (NiGEM) (2001) -0.7
Average -0.4
(a) These are estimates of the long-run elasticities.  The sample periods used vary across studies, but none
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Chart 5 UK export market shares(a)
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) UK goods (services) exports divided by imports of goods (services) in Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States, weighted using UK 2010 goods (services) export
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Chart 6 UK goods export market share and relative
goods export prices(a) 
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) UK goods exports (export prices) divided by imports of goods (export prices of goods) in
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States, weighted using UK 2010 goods
export shares from the 2011 Pink Book.  The last observations are 2011 Q2.  
(b) The trend in the goods export share is based on an HP filter estimated from 1991 Q1 to 
2007 Q2.
(1) The proxy for world trade used here weights together 52 countries’ imports using
2010 UK export shares from the 2011 Pink Book.  These countries account for 90% of
UK exports.  Domit and Shakir (2010) outline possible reasons for the collapse in
world trade.  Research and analysis Developments in UK external trade  297
goods export share is, if anything, stronger than the past
relationship would suggest.  That implies there has been
substantial expenditure switching in goods exports.  That
broad finding is robust to using alternative trends for the goods
export share.
As with aggregate exports, there have been large swings in
most categories of goods exports associated with the collapse
and subsequent rebound in world trade.  But it is not possible
to accurately assess which components of goods exports have
benefited most from the lower exchange rate, because it is
difficult to obtain sectoral data on the relative export price or
overseas demand.
But one way to split the data further is by region — for
example, exports to the European Union (EU) and those to the
rest of the world (non-EU).  These regions accounted for 54%
and 46% of the United Kingdom’s goods exports respectively
in 2010.  The improvement in the UK goods export market
share since 2007 appears to be almost entirely a non-EU
phenomenon (Chart 7).  The export share with EU countries
has continued to decline, albeit at a slower pace than prior to
the depreciation.  The divergent behaviour in export shares has
occurred despite sterling depreciating by a broadly similar
amount against the United Kingdom’s main trading partners.
A proxy for relative goods export prices to the two regions
suggests, however, that UK exporters’ relative prices to the
non-EU have fallen by more than those to the EU.  That may
have contributed to the relatively better performance of 
UK exports to the non-EU.  One explanation for this could be
that exporters to high growth areas have used the depreciation
as an opportunity to expand market share.  This is consistent
with evidence from the Bank of England’s Agents:  they found
that Asian demand has been an important driver of recent
export growth.(1) And the United Kingdom’s loss of market
share in the EU could itself reflect increased competition from
emerging economies.
In summary, goods exports appear to have been boosted
significantly by the depreciation.
Services exports
Exports in the services sector (which account for 40% of total
UK exports), have performed rather differently to goods
exports.  The United Kingdom’s services export market share
rose fairly steadily between 1991 and 2007 (Chart 5).  But
from its peak in 2007 Q4, the share fell significantly, and has
only recently recovered its pre-depreciation level.  Given the
sizable fall in the relative price of services exports (magenta
line (inverted), Chart 8), it appears surprising that the export
share has fallen at all relative to its pre-depreciation trend —
let alone by so much.
But services trade is generally less sensitive to the exchange
rate and prices than goods trade.  The main reason for that is
generally thought to be that services exporters compete on
the basis of product quality (and reputation) rather than price,
with a rise in relative prices sometimes indicating higher
quality.(2) The relationship between the deviation of the
United Kingdom’s services export market share from its trend,
and the relative services export price (Chart 8), is not as close
as that for goods.
(1) Even within the EU, however, there has been a divergence — with stronger growth to
Eastern Europe.  For more details, see Bank of England (2011a).
(2) See Pain and van Welsum (2004).  Pain et al (2005) and Wren-Lewis and Driver
(1998).  Other reasons are that intra-firm trade in services is likely to be less affected
by exchange rate fluctuations, given the scope for multinationals to engage in
transfer pricing.  And, although aggregate services trade may be relatively price
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Chart 7 UK goods export market share in the EU and 
non-EU(a)
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) UK goods exports divided by imports of goods in the other 26 EU countries, and in 35 non-EU
countries (accounting for 86% of goods exports to the non-EU), weighted using UK 2010
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Chart 8 UK services export market share and relative
services export price(a) 
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) UK services exports (export prices) divided by imports of services (export prices of services) in
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States, weighted using UK 2010
services export shares from the 2011 Pink Book.  The last observations are 2011 Q2.  
(b) The trend in the services export share is based on an HP filter estimated from 1991 Q1 to
2007 Q2.298 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q4
Financial services can probably account for why the 
United Kingdom’s services export share has not continued to
increase since the depreciation.  Disaggregated data on
services export volumes show that financial services account
for around a third of UK services exports (Chart 9).  And their
share in GDP fell by 1 percentage point between their peak and
trough, while other services exports continued to increase
(Chart 10).  A box on page 299 considers developments in
financial services exports in more detail.
Import developments
Analogous to exports, the quantity of goods and services
imported into the United Kingdom depends on aggregate
demand in the UK economy and the price of foreign imports
relative to domestic products.  A lower level of sterling should
make goods and services from abroad more expensive and
UK companies and households should respond to this price
change by demanding fewer imports.
Import prices
By 2011 Q3, import prices were over 30% higher than in 
2007 Q2 (green bars, Chart 11).  That is a broadly similar
increase to that of export prices (Chart 3) — the UK terms of
trade have been relatively stable.(1) Over that time, the prices
of domestically produced alternatives (as measured by the
GDP deflator) have risen by around 10% (magenta bars).  So
relative import prices have risen by roughly 20% (orange line).
Import penetration
Demand for imports rebounded sharply as aggregate demand
recovered following the recession (Chart 2).  A closer measure
of UK import demand is import-weighted total final
expenditure (TFE).  That weights together the components of
aggregate UK demand by their estimated import intensities
from the 2005 ONS Input-Output tables.(2) As with exports,
empirical estimates suggest that imports are more sensitive to
movements in demand than to relative prices.  So in order to
detect expenditure switching, it is best to control for these
movements in demand by considering import penetration:
that is, imports as a share of import-weighted TFE.
In the decade leading up to 2007, import penetration steadily
rose (blue line in Chart 12) and relative import prices fell
(magenta line, inverted).  That reflects the fact that global
integration and competition from low-cost economies lowered
the price of imports to all advanced economies and led to an
increase in the share of imports in final expenditure.(3) It may
(1) See MacCoille, Mayhew and Turnbull (2009).  
(2) For instance, some expenditure components such as investment are more reliant on
imports than others, such as government spending.
(3) For instance, see Buisán, Learmonth and Sebastiá-Barriel (2006), MacCoille (2008),






















Chart 9 Breakdowns of services exports and imports
volumes(a)(b)
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) Shares are for 2008, the National Accounts reference year.





















Chart 10 Cumulative changes in services exports and its
components as a share of GDP since 2007 Q2
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Chart 11 Cumulative changes in sterling ERI and relative
import prices since 2007 Q2(a)(b)
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) Relative UK import prices are UK import prices relative to the UK market price GDP deflator.  
(b) The bars represent percentage changes for the individual series.  The orange line represents
the percentage change in relative UK import prices.  The latter is only approximately equal to
the sum of the percentage changes for the individual series, since they are large numbers. Research and analysis Developments in UK external trade  299
Developments in financial services exports
Financial services export volumes accounted for a third of
UK services exports (Chart 9), or 4% of GDP, in 2008.
Between their peak in 2007 Q4 and their trough in 2010 Q3,
they fell by 29% or 1.0 percentage points of GDP (Chart A).
Since then they have recovered somewhat.  Over the longer
period of comparison in Chart 10 (2007 Q2 to 2011 Q3), they
have fallen by 11% or 0.3 percentage points of GDP.  This box
outlines what financial services exports are and tries to explain
why they fell so significantly.(1)
Defining financial services exports
The ONS publishes the breakdown of nominal financial
services exports in the Pink Book.  Monetary financial
institutions, such as banks, represent the largest part (63%) of
financial services exports.  Securities dealers (18%), fund
managers (9%) and other institutions (9%) make up the rest.
For monetary financial institutions and securities dealers, three
broad types of financial services exports are published, each
accounting for about a third of export values in 2008.  First,
commissions and fees, which are explicit charges relating to
transactions.  Second, spread earnings, which are margins on
buying and selling transactions.  Third, financial intermediation
services indirectly measured, the value of the services provided
by financial intermediaries (such as banks) for which no explicit
charges are made;  instead they are paid for as part of the
margin between rates applied to savers and borrowers.
Understanding the fall in financial services exports
Although the breakdown of financial services export volumes is
not available from the ONS, the split of nominal financial
services exports indicates that the significant drop has been
broadly based across its components.
The large fall in financial services exports seems plausible for
many reasons.  The financial nature of the crisis, banking sector
deleveraging, and anecdotal evidence of financial institutions
withdrawing from activities abroad are all consistent with
lower financial services exports.  And financial services exports
have fallen in other countries, implying a fall in the global
demand for financial services trade.
Nevertheless, there are challenges associated with measuring
financial services exports, both conceptually — what should
count as value added — and because of the difficulty of
measuring them.  For example, some services are not charged
for explicitly.  For a full discussion, see Burgess (2011).
Reflecting these difficulties, financial services exports as
measured by the ONS are uncertain.  While large revisions are
relatively rare and typically reflect methodological changes,
evidence from the CBI Financial Services Survey — although
supportive of the initial large drop in exports (Chart B) —
suggests a somewhat earlier and stronger recovery.
Implications of weaker financial services exports
The United Kingdom specialises in financial services.  For
example, they make up a 21 percentage point bigger share of
UK services exports than imports (Chart 9).(2) That is, even
though financial services imports also fell markedly (by 26%
from peak to trough, similar to the fall in exports), the financial
crisis disproportionately affected UK net trade.
And the sector accounts for a bigger proportion of exports
than in other countries (Chart 2 of Burgess (2011)).  Therefore,
even though other countries’ financial services exports were
also reduced by the crisis, the sector has dragged on the 
United Kingdom’s services export and aggregate export shares.
Finally, it is likely that most of the fall in demand for
UKfinancial services output in 2009 was due to exports.(3)
(1) It is heavily based on the boxes on pages 237 and 240 in Burgess (2011).
(2) In terms of total UK exports and imports, the difference is 10 percentage points.  For
example, see Chart 13 of Astley, Smith and Pain (2009).
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Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) Volume of business with overseas customers from CBI Financial Services Survey, percentage
balance.  Four-quarter moving average, adjusted to have the same mean and variance as the
ONS series over the period 2000–11.
Chart B Financial services exports:  ONS and 
CBI Financial Services Survey300 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q4
also, in part, reflect sterling’s appreciation in 1996.  Since the
recent depreciation, the directions of both variables have
reversed, although the large swing in import penetration, in
part, reflects the large fall and subsequent recovery in world
goods trade during and after the recession.
Chart 13 shows, for both aggregate import penetration and
relative import prices, the deviations from the estimated trend
lines in Chart 12.  It suggests that, relative to their trends, the
share of imports in final expenditure has fallen by around
9 percentage points, and relative import prices have risen by
around 27%.  That is broadly consistent with the historical
relationship between the two variables, and with estimates in 
the academic literature (Table B), which on average predict a
4% fall in import volumes or import penetration for every 10%
increase in the relative price of imports.
It is important to recognise that — as with exports — different
components of imports have developed differently.  While
goods imports rebounded sharply in the recovery, services
imports remain much weaker.  Unlike in services exports,
financial services account for a relatively small share of
services imports (Chart 9).  Travel services, on the other hand,
make up nearly a third of services imports, so they are an
important sector to consider.  Indeed, travel services account
for all of the weakness in services import volumes (Chart 14),
and therefore likely much of the import share too.  That
indicates that there has been relatively little expenditure
switching in other types of imports.
Imports of travel services
Travel imports have fallen significantly:  as a share of GDP they
have declined by more than 1 percentage point since 2007 Q2
(Chart 14).  The volume of travel services that are imported
represents overseas tourism by UK residents.  So the decline
reflects less real spending overseas by UK households, in
sterling terms.(1) Tourists from the United Kingdom converting
sterling into foreign currency experienced a sharp fall in their
purchasing power.  As a result, they may have chosen to spend
more on domestic tourism, or taken fewer holidays overall —
the ‘staycation’ effect.
The speed and extent of switching in travel imports could
reflect a number of factors.  First, pass-through of the
exchange rate is likely to be quick:  for the part of travel
imports that is made up of actual spending overseas, there is
instant and complete pass-through of the depreciation as 
UK residents experience an immediate fall in the purchasing
power of sterling.  Second, it may be relatively quick and easy
to stop going overseas since they are less likely to be locked
into long-term contracts than for other types of imports.  And
foreign holidays are often considered a luxury, so can be cut
(1) The ONS publishes a split of nominal travel imports into personal and business travel.
Personal (household) travel makes up the vast majority of the level of travel imports,
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Chart 12 UK import penetration and relative import
prices(a)
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) The dashed lines are pre-depreciation trend lines, based on HP filters estimated from 1991 Q1
to 2007 Q2.
(b) Imports as a proportion of import-weighted TFE.  Import-weighted TFE is calculated by
weighting household consumption (including non-profit institutions serving households),
whole-economy investment (excluding valuables), government spending, stockbuilding
(excluding the alignment adjustment), and exports, by their respective import intensities.
Import intensities are estimated using the United Kingdom Input-Output Analytical 
Tables 2005.
Table B Estimates of the elasticity of import volumes to relative
import prices(a)(b)
Barrell, Choy and Kirby(2006) -0.2
Wren-Lewis and Driver (1998) -0.3
Pain et al (OECD) (2005) -0.3
Barrell, Dury and Pain (NiGEM) (2001) -0.4
Hooper, Johnson and Marquez(2000) -0.6
Crane, Crowley and Quayyum (2007) -0.6
Average -0.4
(a) These are estimates of the long-run elasticities.  The sample periods used vary across studies, but none
include the recent depreciation.
(b) The estimated elasticity of import volumes to changes in import demand is, as with exports, generally found
to be unitary.
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Chart 13 Deviations from trend in UK import
penetration and relative import prices(a)
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) The deviation from trend in import penetration (relative import prices) is the difference
between the two blue (magenta) lines in Chart 12.  The scales of the axes are such that they
equalise the means and variances of the two variables over the period on the chart, to enable
movements in them to be compared quantitatively.  The ratio of the scales, 0.4, therefore
indicates a proxy for the elasticity over this period — in line with the estimates in Table B. Research and analysis Developments in UK external trade  301
back if necessary.  Finally, domestic alternatives — although
they may not be perfect substitutes — do already exist. 
Some of the fall in travel imports may of course be explained
by the fall in aggregate demand.  But the same picture
emerges even after controlling for demand (by looking at
travel imports as a share of domestic consumption).  Unlike
aggregate imports, travel imports have not rebounded with
demand.  And the fact that travel imports also accelerated
rapidly after the 1996 appreciation (Chart 15) adds weight to
the notion that the large movements in travel imports are
driven by expenditure switching.
Travel exports (spending in the United Kingdom by overseas
residents), by contrast, appear to have been much less
responsive to the sterling depreciation.  That may be because
weaker demand abroad has offset the boost from expenditure
switching.(1)
Reasons for the resilience of non-travel imports
Although in aggregate, there has been roughly as much
expenditure switching away from imports as might have been
expected, it is surprising how little appears to have come from
non-travel imports.  This section considers two reasons why
there may have been a limited response to the depreciation
(thus far) from other sectors.  First, a long-running structural
shift in production away from the United Kingdom;  second,
the effect of the United Kingdom’s absolute price level still
being higher than other countries.
As a consequence of trade specialisation (including
outsourcing), there may now be fewer domestic alternatives to
the goods and services the United Kingdom imports.  That
would make it harder for UK firms and households to switch
their expenditure away from imports as import prices rise.
Chart 16 shows the share of inputs to a given goods industry
supplied by UK firms.  In 1991, UK producers supplied over
60% of the inputs in over 80% of the industries in the 
United Kingdom (the two blue bars on the right).  Since then,
the distribution has shifted to the left:  in 2008 UK companies
supplied more than 60% of the UK market in under half the
United Kingdom’s industries (the two green bars on the right).
And there are now considerably more industries with very little
UK presence.(2)
Declining domestic presence in certain industries is a long-run
structural trend.  It may take time for UK firms to set up






















Chart 14 Cumulative changes in services imports and its
components as a share of GDP since 2007 Q2
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(1) There is little available literature on the price elasticity of travel trade.  But Deardorff
et al (2000) and Hung and Viana’s (1995) findings for the United States are broadly
consistent with recent UK developments.  They show that US travel imports are more
responsive to a given change in relative prices than other services imports, and (at
least in the short run) than travel exports.
(2) A lack of domestic alternatives has repeatedly been cited by contacts of the Bank of
England’s Agents.  Nevertheless, overall the Agents have observed an increased pace













Chart 15 Travel services exports and imports(a) 
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) Chained-volume measures (reference year 2008).  Prior to 1996 there are no travel 
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active, which suggests that expenditure switching may be
delayed, if it happens at all.  It will be held back by any
uncertainty over the exchange rate and by tighter credit
conditions.  And this process may even boost imports further
in the short run if some of the capital goods required to
expand production need to be imported.
A second explanation for limited expenditure switching could
be that the absolute price level of imported goods and services
from countries such as China remains lower.  That is, despite
the large rise in import prices following sterling’s depreciation,
there may still be little incentive for households and firms to
switch to domestic alternatives.
In 2007, the UK aggregate price level was considerably higher
than many of its trading partners, in purchasing power parity
(PPP) terms (Chart 17).  Ideally, this chart would compare just
the price of traded goods and services, but such data are not
available.  The depreciation will have increased the price level
of other countries in sterling terms by around 25% (although it
will have also raised the absolute UK price level through higher
imported input costs).
Chart 17 shows that, even after the depreciation, a large price
differential likely remains with some emerging economies such
as India and China.  But the price differential relative to the
United Kingdom’s major European trading partners (such as
Germany) may have narrowed significantly or been eliminated.
Goods import volumes into the United Kingdom from the EU
have been notably weaker than those from the rest of the
world since 2008 (Chart 18).  That may be tentative evidence
that price levels do matter for the degree of expenditure
switching.  As these low-cost emerging economies are now
more integrated in world markets, that headwind to
expenditure switching is more significant than it would have
been 20 years ago.  That implies that there may be less (rather
than slower) expenditure switching than past relationships
would suggest.(1)
Overall impact on net trade
This article has considered movements in the major
components of exports and imports since sterling’s 25%
depreciation from mid-2007.  It has done so in the context of
changes in demand and relative prices as well as their prior
trends.  This section brings together the implications for
aggregate net trade, and compares the response to that in
previous episodes involving significant movements in sterling.
Recent developments in UK net trade
In the decade to 2007, real net trade declined as a share of
GDP (Chart 19), due to developments in the goods balance.
That is likely to have reflected two factors:  first, the impact of
(1) One caveat is that the non-EU data include some advanced economies, such as the










































































Indices:  United Kingdom = 100 
Chart 17 Relative GDP deflators(a)
Sources:  Penn World Table and Bank calculations.
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Chart 19 Net trade:  total, goods and services
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.Research and analysis Developments in UK external trade  303
globalisation felt by many advanced economies, as low-cost
economies increased their share of world trade;  and second, a 
loss of UK competitiveness following sterling’s appreciation 
in 1996.
This article has examined the disaggregated data in order to
uncover the stories behind the recent movements in net trade.
It has argued that since sterling’s depreciation in 2007–09:  
(i) UK goods exports have boosted net trade (magenta bars in
Chart 20);  (ii) although the fall in goods imports provided a
temporary boost during the recession, they have not
contributed positively overall (grey bars);  (iii) the fall in
financial services exports has been a drag on services exports
(green bars);  and (iv) the reduction in services imports,
accounted for by travel, has boosted net trade (orange bars).
Overall, goods net trade has increased substantially since 
2007 Q2, relative to its previous trend (Chart 19).  Services net
trade, meanwhile, has continued to rise in line with its 
pre-depreciation trend.  That reflects the large and broadly
offsetting falls in financial services exports and travel services
imports.  Taking goods and services together, there has been a
significant improvement in real net trade.
Comparison with previous exchange rate episodes
Another way of placing the change in net trade in context is by
comparing it with previous episodes involving significant
movements in sterling.  These may indicate the scale of the
increase in net trade that might be expected.  The
improvement of 1.5 percentage points in net trade is broadly
consistent with the movements following the (smaller) 
1992 depreciation and the (comparable) 1996 appreciation
(Chart 21).
Conclusions
The sterling effective exchange rate depreciated by around
25% between mid-2007 and early 2009.  That has contributed
to a significant improvement in the UK real trade balance,
roughly in line with the movements following previous large
movements in sterling.  This article has considered
developments in the disaggregated data in order to understand
that change in net trade.
The share of UK goods exports in world demand has been
broadly stable, a marked improvement on its previous trend.
The services export market share fell, reflecting the large
decrease in financial services exports associated with the
financial crisis.  And it is consistent with services exports being
less sensitive to movements in the exchange rate.  Together,
these developments mean that the aggregate export share has
risen slightly above its pre-depreciation trend.
Since the depreciation, the share of imports in final
expenditure has fallen, relative to its previous upward 
trend.  That movement is similar to its past relationship with
relative import prices.  Within imports, travel services have
fallen markedly, while there appears to have been less of a
boost so far from weaker sterling to other goods or services
imports.  That may reflect the fact that the United Kingdom
has become more specialised in its production or that a large
price-level difference still exists with other emerging
economies.
Looking ahead, both the level of sterling and developments 
in the rest of the world are likely to be crucial to the 
















Chart 20 Cumulative changes in net trade and its
components as a share of GDP since 2007 Q2(a)
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
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Chart 21 Cumulative changes in net trade as a share of
GDP around previous large sterling moves(a)
Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) Labels indicate the quarter before the exchange rate movement began, with the 
peak-to-trough sterling exchange rate movement in parentheses.304 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q4
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